Hoge Raad, 30-06-2009, BH3084, 08/03991

30 juni 2009

Strafkamer

nr. S 08/03991

NME/SM

op het beroep in cassatie tegen een arrest van het Gerechtshof te Amsterdam van 21 januari 2008, nummer 23/000652-07, in de strafzaak tegen:

[verdachte], geboren te [geboorteplaats] op [geboortedatum] 1962, wonende te [woonplaats].

1.1. Het beroep is ingesteld door de verdachte. Namens deze hebben mr. G.P. Hamer en mr. B.P. de Boer, beiden advocaat te Amsterdam, bij schriftuur middelen van cassatie voorgesteld. De schriftuur is aan dit arrest gehecht en maakt daarvan deel uit.

De Advocaat-Generaal Knigge heeft geconcludeerd tot verwerping van het beroep.

2.2. Art. 6 EVRM luidt:

"1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part in the trial of the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.

(...)

3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:

(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;

(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require;

(...)."

2.3.2. Dit oordeel steunt in het bijzonder op de volgende overwegingen:

"3. The Court's assessment

(a) The general principles applicable in this case

50. The Court reiterates that, even if the primary purpose of Article 6, as far as criminal proceedings are concerned, is to ensure a fair trial by a "tribunal" competent to determine "any criminal charge", it does not follow that the Article has no application to pre-trial proceedings. Thus, Article 6 - especially paragraph 3 - may be relevant before a case is sent for trial if and so far as the fairness of the trial is likely to be seriously prejudiced by an initial failure to comply with its provisions (Imbrioscia, cited above, § 36). As the Court has already held in its previous judgments, the right set out in paragraph 3 (c) of Article 6 of the Convention is one element, amongst others, of the concept of a fair trial in criminal proceedings contained in paragraph 1 (Imbrioscia, cited above, § 37, and Brennan, cited above, § 45).

51. The Court further reiterates that although not absolute, the right of everyone charged with a criminal offence to be effectively defended by a lawyer, assigned officially if need be, is one of the fundamental features of fair trial (Poitrimol v. France, 23 November 1993, § 34, Series A no. 277-A, and Demebukov v. Bulgaria, no. 68020/01, § 50, 28 February 2008). Nevertheless, Article 6 § 3 (c) does not specify the manner of exercising this right. It thus leaves to the Contracting States the choice of the means of ensuring that it is secured in their judicial systems, the Court's task being only to ascertain whether the method they have chosen is consistent with the requirements of a fair trial. In this respect, it must be remembered that the Convention is designed to "guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective" and that assigning counsel does not in itself ensure the effectiveness of the assistance he may afford an accused (Imbrioscia, cited above, § 38).

52. National laws may attach consequences to the attitude of an accused at the initial stages of police interrogation which are decisive for the prospects of the defence in any subsequent criminal proceedings. In such circumstances, Article 6 will normally require that the accused be allowed to benefit from the assistance of a lawyer already at the initial stages of police interrogation. However, this right has so far been considered capable of being subject to restrictions for good cause. The question, in each case, has therefore been whether the restriction was justified and, if so, whether, in the light of the entirety of the proceedings, it has not deprived the accused of a fair hearing, for even a justified restriction is capable of doing so in certain circumstances (see John Murray, cited above, § 63; Brennan, cited above, § 45, and Magee, cited above, § 44).

53. These principles, outlined in paragraph 52 above, are also in line with the generally recognised international human rights standards (see paragraphs 37-42 above) which are at the core of the concept of a fair trial and whose rationale relates in particular to the protection of the accused against abusive coercion on the part of the authorities. They also contribute to the prevention of miscarriages of justice and the fulfilment of the aims of Article 6, notably equality of arms between the investigating or prosecuting authorities and the accused.

54. In this respect, the Court underlines the importance of the investigation stage for the preparation of the criminal proceedings, as the evidence obtained during this stage determines the framework in which the offence charged will be considered at the trial (Can v. Austria, no. 9300/81, Commission's report of 12 July 1984, § 50, Series A no. 96). At the same time, an accused often finds himself in a particularly vulnerable position at that stage of the proceedings, the effect of which is amplified by the fact that legislation on criminal procedure tends to become increasingly complex, notably with respect to the rules governing the gathering and use of evidence. In most cases, this particular vulnerability can only be properly compensated for by the assistance of a lawyer whose task it is, among other things, to help to ensure respect of the right of an accused not to incriminate himself. This right indeed presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove their case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused (see Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810/00, § 100, ECHR 2006-..., and Kolu v. Turkey, no. 35811/97, § 51, 2 August 2005). Early access to a lawyer is part of the procedural safeguards to which the Court will have particular regard when examining whether a procedure has extinguished the very essence of the privilege against self-incrimination (see, mutatis mutandis, Jalloh, cited above, § 101). In this connection, the Court also notes the recommendations of the CPT (paragraphs 39-40 above), in which the committee repeatedly stated that the right of a detainee to have access to legal advice is a fundamental safeguard against ill-treatment. Any exception to the enjoyment of this right should be clearly circumscribed and its application strictly limited in time. These principles are particularly called for in the case of serious charges, for it is in the face of the heaviest penalties that respect for the right to a fair trial is to be ensured to the highest possible degree by democratic societies.

55. Against this background, the Court finds that in order for the right to a fair trial to remain sufficiently "practical and effective" (see paragraph 51 above) Article 6 § 1 requires that, as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided as from the first interrogation of a suspect by the police, unless it is demonstrated in the light of the particular circumstances of each case that there are compelling reasons to restrict this right. Even where compelling reasons may exceptionally justify denial of access to a lawyer, such restriction - whatever its justification - must not unduly prejudice the rights of the accused under Article 6 (see, mutatis mutandis, Magee, cited above, § 44). The rights of the defence will in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements made during police interrogation without access to a lawyer are used for a conviction.

56. - 58. (...)

59. The Court further recalls that neither the letter nor the spirit of Article 6 of the Convention prevents a person from waiving of his own free will, either expressly or tacitly, the entitlement to the guarantees of a fair trial (see Kwiatkowska v. Italy (dec.), no. 52868/99, 30 November 2000). However, if it is to be effective for Convention purposes, a waiver of the right to take part in the trial must be established in an unequivocal manner and be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate to its importance (see Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581/00, § 86, ECHR 2006-...; Kolu, cited above, § 53, and Colozza v. Italy, 12 February 1985, § 28, Series A no. 89). Thus, in the present case, no reliance can be placed on the assertion in the form stating his rights that the applicant had been reminded of his right to remain silent (see paragraph 14 above)."

2.5. De Hoge Raad leidt uit de rechtspraak van het EHRM af dat een verdachte die door de politie is aangehouden, aan art. 6 EVRM een aanspraak op rechtsbijstand kan ontlenen die inhoudt dat hem de gelegenheid wordt geboden om voorafgaand aan het verhoor door de politie aangaande zijn betrokkenheid bij een strafbaar feit een advocaat te raadplegen. Uit de rechtspraak van het EHRM kan echter niet worden afgeleid dat de verdachte recht heeft op de aanwezigheid van een advocaat bij het politieverhoor.

Het vorenoverwogene brengt mee dat de aangehouden verdachte vóór de aanvang van het eerste verhoor dient te worden gewezen op zijn recht op raadpleging van een advocaat. Behoudens in het geval dat hij uitdrukkelijk dan wel stilzwijgend doch in elk geval ondubbelzinnig afstand heeft gedaan van dat recht, dan wel bij het bestaan van dwingende redenen als door het EHRM bedoeld, zal hem binnen de grenzen van het redelijke de gelegenheid moeten worden geboden dat recht te verwezenlijken.