Rechtbank Den Haag, 05-02-2020, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2020:1878, C-09-550982-HA ZA 18-388 (English)
Rechtbank Den Haag, 05-02-2020, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2020:1878, C-09-550982-HA ZA 18-388 (English)
Gegevens
- Instantie
- Rechtbank Den Haag
- Datum uitspraak
- 5 februari 2020
- Datum publicatie
- 6 maart 2020
- Annotator
- ECLI
- ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2020:1878
- Zaaknummer
- C-09-550982-HA ZA 18-388 (English)
Inhoudsindicatie
see: ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2020:865 (Dutch version)
SyRI legislation in breach of European Convention on Human Rights
The Hague District Court has delivered a judgment today in a case about the Systeem Risico Indicatie, or SyRI. SyRI is a legal instrument used by the Dutch government to detect various forms of fraud, including social benefits, allowances, and taxes fraud. The court has ruled that the legislation regulating the use of SyRI violates higher law. The court has decided that this legislation does not comply with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which protects the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence.
Review
The court reviewed whether the SyRI legislation is in breach of provisions of international or European law binding on all persons. The court assessed whether the SyRI legislation complies with Article 8 paragraph 2 ECHR. This particular provision requires striking a fair balance between the interests of the community as a whole, which the legislation serves, and the right of the individuals affected by the legislation to respect for their private life and home.
Special responsibility with introduction of new technologies
According to Article 8 ECHR the Netherlands – as a party to the ECHR – has a special responsibility when applying new technologies. It must strike the right balance between the benefits such technologies bring and the violation of the right to a private life through the use of new technologies. This also applies to the use of SyRI.
Use of SyRI insufficiently transparent and verifiable
After a review of the objects of the SyRI legislation, namely preventing and combating fraud in the interest of economic welfare, in relation to the violation of private life by the legislation, the court has drawn the conclusion that in its current form the SyRI legislation fails to comply with Article 8 paragraph 2 ECHR. The court has decided that the legislation does not strike a fair balance, as required under the ECHR, which would warrant a sufficiently justified violation of private life. In that respect, the application of SyRI is insufficiently transparent and verifiable. As such, the SyRI legislation is unlawful, because it violates higher law and, as a result, has been declared as having no binding effect.
Background
Several civil society interest groups, including the Dutch Section of the International Commission of Jurists (NJCM) and two private individuals, instituted these proceedings against the State of the Netherlands. The Netherlands Trade Union Confederation (FNV) joined as a party in the claimants’ proceedings. Claimants want to call ‘a halt’ to the use of SyRI. They believe that by applying SyRI, the Netherlands government unlawfully violates human rights. The State disagrees and argues that the SyRI legislation contains sufficient safeguards to protect the privacy rights of all.
Uitspraak
vonnis
Commerce Team
Case number / cause list number: C/09/550982 / HA ZA 18-388
Judgment of 5 February 2020
in the matter of
1 NEDERLANDS JURISTEN COMITÉ VOOR DE MENSENRECHTEN
established in Leiden,
2. STICHTING PLATFORM BESCHERMING BURGERRECHTENestablished in Amsterdam,
3. STICHTING PRIVACY FIRST established in Amsterdam,
4. STICHTING KOEPEL VAN DBC-VRIJE PRAKTIJKEN established in Amsterdam,
5. LANDELIJKE CLIËNTENRAAD established in The Hague,
6. [claimant sub 6] of [residence 1] ,
7. [claimant sub 7] of [residence 2] ,
eisers,
attorney mr. A.H. Ekker of Amsterdam,
and
FEDERATIE NEDERLANDSE VAKBEWEGING established in Utrecht,
intervening third party, joining the claimants,
attorney mr. A.H. Ekker of Amsterdam,
versus
THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS seated in The Hague,
defendant,
attorney mr. C.M. Bitter of The Hague.
Claimants are hereinafter jointly also referred to as NJCM et al. and separately as NJCM, Platform Bescherming Burgerrechten, Privacy First, Koepel van DBC-Vrije Praktijken, Landelijke Cliëntenraad, [claimant sub 6] , and [claimant sub 7] , respectively. The intervening third party is referred to as FNV. The defendant is referred to as the State.
This judgment is structured as follows:
1 The course of the proceedings
2. NJCM et al. and FNV
3. The facts
4. The SyRI legislation
4.1-4.3 General
4.4-4.7 Data supply for use by a collaborative alliance
4.8-4.10 Legal basis for SyRI 4.11-4.16 Risk reports, retention obligation, removal from SyRI and confidentiality
Data which may be processed in SyRI 4.18 SyRI application flowchart 4.19-4.26 The request for application of SyRI, advice of LSI and duration of SyRI project
4.27-4.31 Data processing
Feedback on results of risk reports 4.33 Supervision
5. The dispute
5.1-5.4
6. The assessment
Introduction
6.9-6.18 Admissibility, and procedural position of FNV
General assessment framework
6.20-6.26 Protection of human rights 6.27-6.36 Protection under Union law 6.37-6.41 Interrelationship ECHR and Union law and the arguments between the parties
6.42-6.44 The alleged violation of Article 8 ECHR
6.45-6.54 Extent and seriousness of the interference: what is SyRI? Dragnet, untargeted approach, data mining, ‘deep learning’, ‘big data’?
6.55-6.60 Extent and seriousness of the interference: profiling and automated individual decision-making?
6.61-6.65 Abstract
6.66-6.72 In accordance with the law 6.73-6.79 Necessary in a democratic society: general 6.80-6.107 Necessary in a democratic society: proportionality and subsidiarity
6.108-6.117 The claims of NJCM et al.
6.118 The costs of the proceedings
7. The decision
1 The course of the proceedings
2. NJCM et al. and FNV
3. The facts
4. The SyRI legislation
4.1-4.3 General
4.4-4.7 Data supply for use by a collaborative alliance
4.8-4.10 Legal basis for SyRI 4.11-4.16 Risk reports, retention obligation, removal from SyRI and confidentiality
Data which may be processed in SyRI 4.18 SyRI application flowchart 4.19-4.26 The request for application of SyRI, advice of LSI and duration of SyRI project
4.27-4.31 Data processing
Feedback on results of risk reports 4.33 Supervision
5. The dispute
5.1-5.4
6. The assessment
Introduction
6.9-6.18 Admissibility, and procedural position of FNV
General assessment framework
6.20-6.26 Protection of human rights 6.27-6.36 Protection under Union law 6.37-6.41 Interrelationship ECHR and Union law and the arguments between the parties
6.42-6.44 The alleged violation of Article 8 ECHR
6.45-6.54 Extent and seriousness of the interference: what is SyRI? Dragnet, untargeted approach, data mining, ‘deep learning’, ‘big data’?
6.55-6.60 Extent and seriousness of the interference: profiling and automated individual decision-making?
6.61-6.65 Abstract
6.66-6.72 In accordance with the law 6.73-6.79 Necessary in a democratic society: general 6.80-6.107 Necessary in a democratic society: proportionality and subsidiarity
6.108-6.117 The claims of NJCM et al.
6.118 The costs of the proceedings
7. The decision